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The paper argues that economic integration causes problems for the labor market of high-
wage countries due to cross-border labor mobility and the accompanying increase in labor 
supply. Empirical evidence is provided from an analysis of regional labor market effects of 
German re-unification. In the aftermath of the re-unification shock, despite some gain in 
employment, border regions situated on the former German-German border are found to have 
experienced a fall in the relative wage position and an increase in unemployment relative to 
other West-German regions. As this points to adverse labor supply effects for resident 
workers due to cross-border labor mobility, this result is bad news for EU regions situated on 
the border with the Accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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 1 Introduction
In its recent past Europe has seen the opening up of several internal borders and with the
accession of new members states in Central and Eastern Europe to the European Union
further borders are bound to fall. This fast unexpected movement has been welcomed by
many as a relief from suppression. The probably best known single event is the border
removal in the city of Berlin in 1989; the pictures of people from both parts of the border
celebrating have been noticed throughout the world. However, in di®erence to this focal
point of history the expected removal of further barriers to mobility at the EU's eastern
border is regarded with mixed emotions: the removal of the border is welcomed as it is an
impediment to travel and trade, but at the same time the competition with cheap labor
from across the border is feared as a threat to the labor market conditions faced by the
resident workers. Whereas estimates of the in°ow of immigrant workers point to a relatively
modest expansion of labor supply (e.g., Boeri and Bruecker, 2001), it is important to note
that due to relatively small distances other forms of cross-sectional labor mobility such as
weekly or daily commuting is likely to be important. This becomes particulary obvious in
the case of Berlin - situated only about 50 miles from the German / Polish border.
Regardless of the actual size of the labor supply expansion in the course of European En-
largement, in order to assess its labor market consequences one might nevertheless consult
the literature about the impact of immigration on the labor market of host countries. Ac-
cording to surveys of the literature such as Friedberg and Hunt (1995) or Zimmermann
(1995) existing empirical evidence on the impact of immigration on the employment op-
portunities of native workers shows only quite moderate e®ects. However, many studies
1rely on cross-sectional di®erences in immigrant density across local labor markets, where it
is quite di±cult to identify the labor supply e®ect of immigration. As recently emphasized
in Borjas (2003) if immigrants select themselves into speci¯c labor markets with favorable
conditions, empirical results with respect to adverse supply e®ects on resident workers are
likely to be biased and some additional information is needed for identi¯cation.
Given this background this paper sheds light on the labor market e®ects of economic in-
tegration, and, in particular, on the impact of cross-border labor mobility. It exploits the
signi¯cant reduction in impediments to labor mobility in the process of the German re-
uni¯cation in order to identify labor supply shocks in the West German labor market. More
speci¯cally, based on the assumption that cost of mobility are increasing in distance, we
focus on the impact of the border removal in the regions situated at the German-German
border against the reference case of regions in the hinterland. German re-uni¯cation is
probably one of the most interesting cases of economic integration and its impact on the
labor market in recent history, because the impediments to mobility mainly consisted in
the border itself. Other impediments to mobility which are often encountered at inter-
national borders are largely absent. People at both sides of the border share a common
language and the same cultural background. Possibly even more important, due to their
formal status as West-German citizens people from East-Germany could immediately en-
ter the West-German labor market even before German re-uni¯cation was established at
the constitutional level. At the same time re-uni¯cation constituted a rather unexpected
event, which can be considered as a quasi-experiment for the border regions.
Surprisingly little is known about the consequences of this unique experiment of integra-
2tion in the border regions. Jung (2002) and Kruesemann (2002) provide some descriptive
evidence for the eastern border of Lower Saxony pointing towards a deterioration of labor
market conditions. However, aside of those case studies, to the best of the authors' knowl-
edge this paper provides the ¯rst systematic analysis of the labor market integration shock
experienced in the regions at the western side of the former German-German border.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section provides a theoretical discussion of
the possible labor market e®ects of economic integration, yielding several testable empirical
predictions. In particular, it shows that a signi¯cant reduction in transaction cost which
could possibly arise from a border removal will lead to an employment expansion accompa-
nied with a decline in wages and a rise in unemployment in the high-wage region. Section 3
lays out the investigation approach to test these predictions empirically. Section 4 presents
the results, which con¯rm that in comparison with the labor market development in other
parts of West Germany and controlling for other possibly interfering developments, the
border regions have in fact seen an increase in employment, a reduction in wages, and an
increase in unemployment. The last section provides a conclusion.
2 Theoretical Considerations
Basically a border de¯nes the geographic area for which a set of public institutions is
de¯ned. As a consequence, by crossing the border an agent may face signi¯cant changes
in the institutional environment under which he or she operates. As this will often tend
to undermine the e®ectiveness of policies many borders, national borders in particular,
constitute signi¯cant barriers to mobility. In the present context, we will focus on the
3latter aspect of a border and, thus, the following treats the border simply as an institution
which imposes (sometimes prohibitive) transaction cost on the exchange of goods and
services between regions or countries.
A removal of a border will signi¯cantly expand the opportunities of regions to engage in
trade as well as to demand or supply factor services from one region to the other. Hence,
the removal of a border can be seen as a discrete change in the degree of integration of
goods and factor markets. It is obvious that the reduction of transaction cost may be
important for all markets. But in order to focus on local labor market e®ects consider a
simple small open economy which trades goods at internationally ¯xed prices and lends or
supplies capital at a common rate of interest. In this economy, without further assumptions
the opening up of the border with another small country which may or may not be open
for trade with the rest of the world does not a®ect the price vector.
To be more precise, let us focus on a country with two regions, a main region (denoted as
(1) in Figure 1) and a border region (2). The latter is adjacent to a third region (3), which
is part of another country. For simplicity, let regions 2 and 3 be of equal size. In each
Figure 1: Stylized Map of the Regions
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region there is a set of households distributed in space such that the households di®er in
terms of their cost of mobility. Consider households with place of residence within region
4i. Regarding the option to work in region j the spatial distribution of households gives
rise to a distribution of the cost of mobility mij. In addition to household-speci¯c cost of
mobility further cost result from the imposition of the border between region 2 and 3. Due
to the border, mobility between regions 2 and 3 is burdened with additional cost of ±.
For simplicity, assume that cost of mobility are additive. A household faces mobility cost
within the region
mi;i = !:
Let ! be distributed across households with density g (!) in all regions, where ! 2 [0;1]
and g(!) > 08! 2 [0;1]. If an individual travels to a neighboring region it faces additional
mobility cost ¹ 2 [0;1], such that the total cost of the transfer from region i to region j
is
mi;j = ¹ + !; ji ¡ jj = 1:
Again, let the additional component ¹ be distributed identically in all regions. The density
of ¹ is denoted as f (¹) with f(¹) > 08¹ 2 [0;1]. With regard to mobility to more distant
regions we assume that for each individual total cost is higher
mi;j > ¹ + !; ji ¡ jj > 1:
In order to simplify the analysis, we focus in the following on the case where, initially, the
wage in region 3 is lower than the wage in regions 1 and 2, and where wages in regions 1
and 2 are equal. In other words we look at the impact of integration between a low-wage
country, represented by region 3, and a high-wage country, consisting of a border region (2)
5and a region in the hinterland (1). With the assumption that w1 = w2 > w3 a household
from region 1 will supply labor in region 1 if
! < w1; (1)
where w1 is the market wage in region 1; otherwise the household abstains from partici-
pating. Supplying labor to region 2 or 3 is not attractive as wages there are not higher.
Similarly, a household from region 2 will supply labor to region 2 if
! < w2; (2)
otherwise the household is not participating. In the initial situation, supplying labor to
region 1 or 3 is not attractive as wages there are not higher. Only for households from
region 3 the initial situation is such that some may want to supply labor to region 2.
Households from region 3 supply labor to the low-wage region 3 if
¹ ¸ w2 ¡ ± ¡ w3 and ! < w3; (3)
but to region 2 if
¹ < w2 ¡ ± ¡ w3 and ! + ¹ < w2 ¡ ±: (4)








f (¹)g (!)d!d¹ = G(w3)[1 ¡ F(w2 ¡ ± ¡ w3)]; (5)













where ¸ = ! + ¹ and h(¹;¸) is the joint distribution of mobility cost within and across









f (¹)g (!)d!d¹: (6)







In order to determine the impact of the transaction cost ± on the level of wages we need
some assumptions about labor demand. Suppose that employment is chosen such that
the marginal product equals the wage rate and suppose that production is determined
by a function F (Li;»i); where Li is the labor input and »i is a region-speci¯c factor of


















i is the labor demand in region i. In this setting we can derive the comparative
static e®ect of a change in the transaction cost on wages and participation in region 2
relative to region 1. This e®ect is of particular interest since both regions are assumed
to be part of a high-wage country. However, in our setting they di®er with respect to
their exposure to labor supply shocks resulting from a reduction in the cost of crossing the
border between regions 2 and 3.
To avoid further case distinctions, we assume in the following that the mobility cost ± is
less than prohibitive. With `less than prohibitive' we mean ± < w2 ¡ w3 such that in all
situations considered there is always a strictly positive share of individuals from region 3
supplying labor in region 2.
First, it is helpful to state the partial impact of the transaction cost on labor supply.
Lemma 1 Given wages, a decrease in the transaction cost of mobility ± will raise labor
supply in the border region of the high-wage country.




= ¡f (w2 ¡ ± ¡ w3)G(w3) ¡
Z w2¡±¡w3
0
f (¹)g (w2 ¡ ± ¡ ¹)d¹:
8The statement follows since the expression is strictly negative.
The labor supply increase in the border region following from a decline in mobility cost is
at the expense of the low-wage region which is necessarily loosing labor supply. Formally,
this can be stated by a Lemma as well.
Lemma 2 Given wages, a decrease in the transaction cost of mobility will lower labor
supply in the low-wage region. The decrease of labor supply in the low-wage region is always
smaller than the increase of labor supply in the border region of the high-wage country.




= f (w2 ¡ ± ¡ w3)G(w3):
The ¯rst statement in Lemma 2 holds since the derivative is strictly positive. The second












f (¹)g (w2 ¡ ± ¡ ¹)d¹:
With regard to the impact of wages in the border region on labor supply, we can state the
following:
Lemma 3 A decrease of the wage rate in the border region of the high-wage country will
lower labor supply in this region and raise labor supply in the low-wage region. The decrease
9of labor supply in the border region of the high-wage country is always larger than the
increase of labor supply in the low-wage region.




= g (w2) + f (w2 ¡ ± ¡ w3)G(w3) +
Z w2¡±¡w3
0
f (¹)g (w2 ¡ ± ¡ ¹)d¹:




= ¡f (w2± ¡ w3)G(w3);
which con¯rms the increase in labor supply in region 3 following from a reduction of the








= g (w2) +
Z w2¡±¡w3
0
f (¹)g (w1 ¡ ± ¡ ¹)d¹;
which is strictly positive under our assumptions.
Now we are in a position to derive the impact of the transaction cost of mobility ± on
wages.
Proposition 1 Suppose the slope of the labor demand function is negative. A marginal re-
duction in the transaction cost of mobility will then reduce the wage rate, raise employment
and lower participation in the border region of the high-wage country.





































































@w3 + f (w2 ¡ ± ¡ w3)G(w3) + g (w3)[1 ¡ F (w2 ¡ ± ¡ w3)]
:
Note that 0 < ° < 1. From Lemma 1 and 2 we know that the sum of the two terms in
the numerator is negative, even if ° were unity. With Lemma 3 also the denominator is




The increase of employment in the high-wage country follows from the negative slope of
the labor demand function. The decline in participation in region 2 simply follows from
the cdf. of the reservation wage.
Our model thus demonstrates that the reduction or removal of barriers at the border
will have a di®erential e®ect on regional labor markets in the high-wage country. In our
model, under the simplifying assumption of initially equal wages in both regions of the
high-wage country, the region which is not adjacent to the low-wage region is not a®ected
by a marginal reduction in the transaction cost of mobility from the low-wage region to
11the high-wage country. The border region, however, is a®ected due to an increase in
labor supply from the low-wage region. Our empirical approach will exploit exactly this
di®erence between border and non-border regions in the high-wage country.
In a more general model, the di®erential e®ect of a labor supply shock on border and non-
border regions could be discussed in more detail. If, for instance, there is a positive wage
di®erential between region 1 and region 2 possibly arising from a center-periphery structure,
a sort of domino{e®ect will arise where the integration shock is propagated spatially by
the labor supply behavior of residents as is discussed in the case of U.S. immigration
(e.g., Filer, 1992, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997, and Card, 2001). Another interesting
extension could refer to the productivity di®erences »1;»2 and »3 which have been taken as
given, so far. One might argue that with the removal of the border the attraction of labor
to the high-wage country will give rise to agglomeration e®ects and further increases in
productivity (Hanson, 1997). However, for the present purpose of studying the integration
e®ect on a border region's labor market, the analysis presented already provides us with a
su±cient set of empirical implications.
3 Investigation Approach
Empirical evidence on the impact of the removal of barriers at the border on the labor
market is obtained from a panel of counties in West Germany. From the total of 327 coun-
ties in West Germany (excluding West-Berlin - because of its speci¯c geographic situation)
20 counties are directly situated at the inner-German border. Invoking the above concept
of spatial transaction cost ± it can be assumed that the decline in spatial transaction cost
12relative to East Germany is particularly e®ective in these regions. Hence, they should
have been exposed more than other regions to the integration shock from re-uni¯cation.
The empirical analysis exploits the variation in the geographic situation of the counties
by means of a \di®erences in di®erences" approach, that is we look at the change in the
position of labor market indicators in regions at the border relative to other regions. In
several respects the labor market integration e®ects of re-uni¯cation in the regions directly
situated at the German-German border are a promising subject for this approach. As
pointed out by Angrist and Krueger (1999) this approach is \[...] well suited to estimating
the e®ect of sharp changes in the economic environment or government policy." (ibid.,
p.1296). Certainly, the entire removal of the inner-German border quali¯es as such a sharp
and drastic change.
Before re-uni¯cation, due to the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the corresponding
enforcement of border controls in East Germany, mobility from East to West Germany was
severely suppressed.1 But, when the Berlin Wall tumbled in November 1989 people from
East Germany were free to leave their country.2 In the subsequent months, re-uni¯cation
was put forward in a quick succession of events. Commuting cost across the border were
quickly lowered by improving, or reviving, roads, public transport and communication sys-
tems. The political decision process accompanying re-uni¯cation had its most remarkable
points in the treaty concerned with the creation of the monetary and economic union be-
1Whereas in the 12 years between 1949 and 1961 approximately 2.7 Million people moved to the west,
in the period between 1962 and 1989 only 0.6 Million people came (Sinn and Sinn, 1992).
2Already in 1989 a total of about 0.39 Million individuals moved to West Germany, followed by nearly
0.4 Million in 1990 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999). The mass exodus had begun already before November
9 across the Hungarian-Austrian border and via the West German embassies in Prague and Budapest, but
the majority of people who left the GDR in 1989 came across the German-German border after the lifting
of the \Iron Curtain".
13tween both German States, which came into force on July 1, 1990, and the treaty concerned
with the political re-uni¯cation, three months later on October 3.
Already before 1990 citizens from East-Germany were formally treated as German citizens
in West Germany. Thus, with the barriers to entry falling in November 1989 East German
citizens could immediately enter the West-German labor market at drastically reduced
transaction cost. As the West German labor market was and still is characterized by
signi¯cantly higher wages, and since unemployment quickly rose in East Germans due
to the collapse of socialist economy, it seems reasonable to expect an expansion of labor
supply in the West-German labor market after re-uni¯cation, in particular, in the border
regions. A further, important characteristic of German re-uni¯cation is the high degree of
unexpectedness. Although it seems hard to understand nowadays, still in 1989 the vast
majority of Germans - at least in the West - did not take the opening up of the German-
German border as a serious possibility. All this justi¯es to consider the removal of barriers
at the German - German border as a sharp change in the economic environment of the
border regions and, therefore, a di®erences in di®erences approach seems appropriate in
order to test for its labor market e®ects.
Basically, the analysis summarizes the development of key labor market indicators before
and after the re-uni¯cation shock by regressions of the following type
yi;t = ¯2 (d2;t £ Borderi) + ¢¢¢ + ¯T (dT;t £ Borderi)
+ µ2d2;t + ¢¢¢ + µTdT;t + ¼i;t + ®i + ui;t (11)
To capture common trends for each dependent variable yi;t we include a set of time dummies
14d2;t;:::;dT;t such that ds;t = 1 if s = t, and zero otherwise. Time-invariant characteristics of
regions are captured by the ¯xed regional e®ect ®i. In di®erence to the well known study of
Card (1990) on the \Mariel boatlift" the exposition to the shock is not captured by a single
variable, but by a couple of interaction terms between the geographic situation of a county
at the border and the respective year. This re°ects the fact that the economic integration
between the two parts of Germany constituted not just a single shock in 1990, after the
border fell, but rather a sequence of shocks. The setting deviates further from the study
of Card (1990) in introducing an explicit control variable, which re°ects the availability
of investment subsidies due to German regional policy. More speci¯cally, we introduce a
dummy variable ¼i;t which is unity if a county encloses locations eligible for investment
subsidies. Note that this variable is time-varying at the local level as the regional policy is
revised annually and has been reorganized substantially in the aftermath of re-uni¯cation.3
In order to test for the e®ects of integration as outlined in Section 2 the empirical analysis
uses a variety of di®erent indicator variables for the development of local labor markets,
including not only wages, salaries, and employment, but also the local unemployment rate.
The latter variable is important because no other indicator of the participation of the
resident population is available; employment ¯gures refer to the location of the employer
3In West Germany, regional policy before 1989 was focussed on two types of regions. Firstly, a program
called `Improvement of regional economic structure' for regions with poor economic performance or su®er-
ing from structural change is in place since 1969. The main tool of this program is investment subsidies.
Secondly, regional policy has been concerned with regions at the German-German border, the so-called
`Zonenrandgebiet'. They were considered to be severely disadvantaged by their location and given access
to all measures of the `Improvement (...)' program. After re-uni¯cation, the focus of German regional
policy shifted to East Germany. The concept of `Zonenrandgebiet' was e®ectively dropped in September
1991, and already since October 3, 1990 all regions in East Germany had access to the `Improvement (...)'
program. However, also after 1990 there have always been several regions in West Germany, both in the
former `Zonenrandgebiet' and outside, that had access to measures of German regional policy.
15and not to the place of residence of the household. Thus, they are not indicative of the
participation of the resident population.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Nobs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Unemployment rate (in %) 4562 8.25 3.11 2.27 20.9
Employment per capita 4890 .331 .116 .126 .942
Population (in 1000) 4890 192 163 33.0 1710
Hours per empl. (Manuf.) 3272 1.15 .840 .321 12.1
Investment per empl. (Manuf.) a 3273 11.9 5.07 2.89 65.7
Wage (per day) a 3912 124 27.8 70.5 198
Salary (per day) a 3911 158 35.8 81.6 246
Regional policy 4890 .445 .494 .00 1.00
a measured in Deutsche Mark and 2000-Prices. Sample size varies due to missing values.
4 Results
The ¯rst column in Table 2 reports results for the rate of unemployment as the dependent
variable. Starting in 1990, border regions show a signi¯cant increase in unemployment
relative to 1987 and the di®erential grows to 2.28% in 2000. Thus, the results indicate
that the opening of the border resulted in a strong, persistent and signi¯cant disadvantage
of border regions relative to the base year 1987 in terms of unemployment. The dummy
for regional policy is positive and signi¯cant, indicating that unemployment is higher in
regions subject to special investment incentives provided by regional policy. However, note
that the coe±cient re°ects both the distribution of investment subsidies as well as their
impact on the economy. Thus, it is not clear whether the positive signi¯cance indicates a
failure of regional policy to reduce unemployment or just the selection of regions into the
program.
16Columns (2) to (4) in Table 3 depict results for total employment and population. The
employment series shows a positive development after re-uni¯cation. For the period be-
tween 1991 and 1997 the employment di®erential relative to the base year is signi¯cantly
positive. However, at the end of the time period analyzed a decline in employment - albeit
not signi¯cant - is found. Despite of the, at least, temporary increase in employment, pop-
ulation shows a growing negative di®erential in the border regions. In 2000 the population
is reduced by almost 3 % relative to the period 1986. Taking together, employment per
capita is signi¯cantly increased in the periods after re-uni¯cation.
In order to see whether further employment e®ects in terms of hours have occurred after re-
uni¯cation, column (5) reports some statistics for the hours worked (for blue-collar workers
only) in the manufacturing industry scaled with the number of employees (including white-
collars). However, no signi¯cant increase in hours is found. The scaling of hours worked
by the total number of employees is certainly a problem, but the number of blue-collar
workers was not available.
In order to interpret the border development as indicative of the integration e®ect on the
labor market it is important to control for the presence of investment subsidies due to
regional policy, in particular, because of the cutback of those subsidies in the aftermath
of re-uni¯cation. Therefore, all regressions employ the dummy for presence of those sub-
sidies already mentioned before. To test whether this dummy is in fact able to control
for the cutback of investment subsidies an alternative regression has been carried out for
investment per employee in manufacturing. If regional policy is su±ciently captured by
this dummy variable the investment series scaled with employment and conditional on the
regional policy dummy should not display a signi¯cant di®erence in the development of the
17Table 2: Estimation Results




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border£(year=87) -.002 -.008 .006
(.015) (.013 ) (.010)
Border£(year=88) .247 -.008 -.014 .006
(.441) (.014) (.012 ) (.010)
Border£(year=89) .598 -.011 -.017 .007
(.394) (.013) (.011 ) (.010)
Border£(year=90) 1.16 ?? -.000 -.015 .014 .009 -.067
(.370) (.013) (.011 ) (.010) (.030) (.102)
Border£(year=91) 1.34 ?? .028 ?? -.019 ? .047 ?? .190 -.032
(.362) (.013) (.011 ) (.010) (.201) (.110)
Border£(year=92) 1.19 ?? .027 ?? -.022 ?? .049 ?? .009 .037
(.363) (.013) (.010 ) (.010) (.039) (.112)
Border£(year=93) 1.22 ?? .028 ?? -.022 ?? .050 ?? .023 -.083
(.376) (.012) (.010 ) (.010) (.030) (.104)
Border£(year=94) 1.18 ?? .035 ?? -.021 ?? .056 ?? .023 -.019
(.409) (.012) (.010 ) (.010) (.030) (.106)
Border£(year=95) 1.36 ?? .040 ?? -.021 ?? .060 ?? .024 -.060
(.419) (.012) (.010 ) (.010) (.029) (.097)
Border£(year=96) 1.70 ?? .031 ?? -.022 ?? .053 ?? .039 -.072
(.419) (.013) (.011 ) (.010) (.031) (.109)
Border£(year=97) 1.90 ?? .030 ?? -.020 ?? .050 ?? .039 -.043
(.384) (.014) (.012 ) (.010) (.031) (.113)
Border£(year=98) 1.98 ?? .021 -.021 ?? .042 ?? .023 -.162
(.371) (.015) (.012 ) (.010) (.029) (.115)
Border£(year=99) 2.08 ?? .010 -.023 ?? .032 ?? .036 -.110
(.387) (.017) (.013 ) (.011) (.031) (.132)
Border£(year=00) 2.28 ?? -.010 -.029 ?? .018
(.385) (.017) (.014 ) (.011)
Regional policy .124 ?? -.037 ?? -.015 ?? -.022 ?? .012 .081 ??
(.049) (.002) (.001 ) (.002) (.014) (.020)
Time period 87-00 86-00 86-00 86-00 89-99 89-99
R2 .937 .996 .999 .988 .442 .602
Nobs. 4,562 4,890 4,890 4,890 3,272 3,273
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. A star denotes signi¯cance at the 10%-level,
two stars denote signi¯cance at 5%-level. All estimations include a full set of regional and time ¯xed
e®ects.
18border regions. Column (6) reports corresponding results. On the one hand, investments
in manufacturing in border regions show no systematically di®erent reaction to the inte-
gration shock than investments in non-border regions. On the other hand, the provision of
investment incentives proves highly signi¯cant suggesting that, in fact, regional policy has
been e®ective in creating investment. Thus, the results con¯rm that the dummy variable
for regional policy is a su±cient indicator of investment incentives in our speci¯cation.
The results for wages and salaries of low and medium skilled employees are presented in
Table 3. Columns (7) and (8) report results for simple regressions following the \di®er-
ences in di®erences" methodology. From 1991 on, wages are signi¯cantly lower in border
regions compared to non-border regions. Once more, the e®ects are persistent and highly
signi¯cant. From 1991 to 1997, the average wage in border regions is between 2.1% and
4.2% lower than in the base period. Also for salaries a negative development is found,
although the interaction terms between the border and period e®ects are not signi¯cant.
Columns (9) and (10) report further results on wages and salaries obtained from regres-
sions using individual data. These regressions include some additional controls for the
characteristics of the workers in terms of age and education as in a standard Mincer-type
wage regression. In addition, these regressions exploit the information about the indus-
try a±liation of each worker and introduce controls for the industry as well as indicators
for hours worked in the considered industry and negotiated wages according to the corre-
sponding industry level wage agreement.4 The negative development in the wage level is
still con¯rmed, even though the individual characteristics as well as the industry charac-
4This variable is taken from Buettner and Fitzenberger, 2002.
19Table 3: Estimation Results, continued
Dep. Variable log Wage log Salar. log Wage log Salar.
(7) (8) (9) (10)
log Hours .551 ??
(.055)
log Contract wage .377 ?? .029
(.043) (.052)
Skill .088 ?? .090 ??
(.001) (.004)
Age .333 ?? .698 ??
(.003) (.006)
Age, squared -.037 ?? -.073 ??
(.000) (.001)
Border£(year=87) -.005 -.002 - .005 -.001
(.008) (.015) (.007) (.009)
Border£(year=88) -.010 -.010 - .007 -.015
(.008) (.012) (.008) (.010)
Border£(year=89) -.012 -.000 - .008 -.016 ??
(.008) (.010) (.007) (.007)
Border£(year=90) -.010 .013 -.010 .001
(.008) (.012) (.007) (.009)
Border£(year=91) -.021 ?? .004 - .015 ? .004
(.007) (.010) (.006) (.008)
Border£(year=92) -.025 ?? -.003 - .013 ? -.004
(.007) (.015) (.006) (.011)
Border£(year=93) -.026 ?? -.008 - .022 ?? -.019 ??
(.007) (.012) (.006) (.008)
Border£(year=94) -.022 ?? -.007 -.018 ?? -.023 ??
(.008) (.011) (.007) (.008)
Border£(year=95) -.039 ?? .000 - .026 ?? -.018
(.008) (.013) (.007) (.012)
Border£(year=96) -.042 ?? -.015 - .028 ?? -.024 ??
(.008) (.011) (.007) (.010)
Border£(year=97) -.032 ?? .002 - .027 ?? -.021 ??
(.008) (.014) (.007) (.019)
Regional policy -.006 ?? .005 ? -.004 ?? .003 ?
(.001) (.003) (.001) (.002)
Time period 86-97 86-97 86-97 86-97
R2 .978 .935 .366a .416a
Nobs. 3,912 3,911 555,578 280,254
If indexed with a R2 refers to the data after within transformation. Columns (7) and (8) report het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. Columns (9) and (10) report standard errors
obtained from a Huber / White Sandwich estimator taking account of the dependence within regions. A
star denotes signi¯cance at the 10%-level, two stars denote signi¯cance at 5%-level. All estimations include
a full set of regional and time ¯xed e®ects. Columns (9) and (10) also include industry dummies.
20teristics are highly signi¯cant, pointing to the typical age and education e®ects and to a
signi¯cant impact of industry characteristics. This shows that the simple \di®erences in
di®erences" approach is not yielding spurious results: di®erences in the composition of the
workforce cannot explain the observed trend towards lower wages in the border region in
the aftermath of re-uni¯cation.
Following conventional practice the results have been obtained relying on robust infer-
ence with regard to heteroscedasticity and random group e®ects (e.g., Moulton, 1990) in
case of individual data. Recently, Bertrand, Du°o, and Mullainthan (2004) have criti-
cized this practice for its neglect of possible autocorrelation. They show that the conven-
tional approach in presence of autocorrelation tends to overreject the null-hypotheses of
no-treatment e®ect. As a particularly simple but e®ective remedy against false rejections
of the null-hypothesis they suggest to ¯rst run a basic regression without the treatment
e®ect, and then to test for the treatment e®ect using aggregates of the residuals before and
after the shock.5
Aside of its simplicity this approach is appealing due to its transparency and reliance on
5Formally, the approach starts with estimating
yi;t = µ2d2;t + ¢¢¢ + µTdT;t + ¼i;t + ®i + ui;t: (12)
The estimated residuals are then aggregated into two periods, one before (b vi;1) and the other after (b vi;2)












Finally, the aggregated residuals are regressed on the border e®ect and time- as well as region-speci¯c ¯xed
e®ects in the two-period panel regression
^ vi;t = ¯ (d2;t £ Borderi) + µd2;t + ®i + ²i;t t = 1;2; (13)
where period 1 is before and period 2 is after re-uni¯cation such that ¯ captures the treatment e®ect.
21Table 4: Estimation Results based on Residual Aggregation




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border£(year=90) .937 ?? .029 ?? -.010 ? .038 ?? .046 .033
(.292) (.007) (.053) (.006) (.045) (.046)
R2 .446 .652 .680 .552 .150 .598
Nobs. 652 652 652 652 455 448
Dep. Variable log Wage log Salar. log Wage log Salar.
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Border£(year=90) -.017 ?? .003 -.011 ?? .008
(.005) (.010) (.005) (.010)
R2 .240 .242 .955 .895
Nobs. 652 651 652 652
Results of estimations following the suggestions of Bertrand, Du°o, and Mullainthan (2004), see text
for further explanation. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. A star denotes
signi¯cance at the 10%-level, two stars denote signi¯cance at 5%-level. All estimations include a constant,
a time-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect and a full set of regional ¯xed e®ects.
standard procedures. Table 4 displays corresponding results for each of the series analyzed
above. In order to restrict attention to the re-uni¯cation e®ect the estimates focus on the
period in the ¯rst ¯ve years after re-uni¯cation (1990-1994) relative to the periods before
re-uni¯cation using up to four periods (1986-1989).6 Nevertheless, all of the previous results
are clearly con¯rmed. In the period after re-uni¯cation, unemployment and employment
are signi¯cantly higher, and wages are signi¯cantly lower in the border regions. Note that
as in the above results salaries do not show a signi¯cant e®ect.7
6Sensitivity analysis reveals that extending or reducing the post-uni¯cation period considered has little
e®ects on the results.
7Note the high R2 in speci¯cations (9) and (10), which re°ects the control for individual characteristics
in the underlying regressions using individual data.
22Taking together the results are clearly in accordance with the predictions of our theoretical
model. If in fact the removal of the border barriers has contributed to a higher labor
supply in the regions situated in West-Germany close to the German-German border,
total employment should have increased. At the same time wages should be reduced,
relatively, and, furthermore, the participation of the residents in these regions should fall,
possibly causing an increase in the local unemployment rate. The empirical analysis has
shown that all of these predicted trends are supported in the data. The adverse population
trend is in accordance with the decline in the relative attractiveness of the labor market of
border regions and highlights, once again, the importance of cross-border mobility other
than migration.
5 Conclusion
From the analysis presented in this paper we can conclude that labor market competition
from across the border is a plausible explanation for the joint movement of labor market
conditions in West German border regions in the aftermath of German re-uni¯cation. More
speci¯cally, the results suggest that in line with the predictions from the theoretical analysis
workers from East Germany commuting but not necessarily migrating to West German
border regions expanded labor supply and led to lower wages and higher unemployment
among resident workers even though employment in these regions has been increased.
The results cast doubts about the prospects for the labor markets in EU regions situated
at the EU border with the Accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the
course of EU Enlargement. One has to be careful, however, in translating the ¯ndings of
23the present paper to the case of EU Enlargement. One important di®erence between EU
Enlargement and the integration at the German-German border is that the accession of
the Central and Eastern European Countries is an expected event individuals and ¯rms
have begun to anticipate years before integration itself is now going to take place. Workers
from these countries already today commute across the border into the EU, and goods
markets are already today at least partly integrated. Therefore, we would expect to ¯nd
less pronounced integration e®ects for the EU border regions to Central and Eastern Europe
after the accession of these countries to the EU. However, even though it is di±cult to say
to which extent the integration e®ect in the labor market has already taken place, the
results presented suggest that there is a cost of EU-Enlargement to the EU countries as,
ceteris paribus, resident workers su®er from a deterioration of labor market conditions due
to cross-border labor mobility.
Data Sources and De¯nitions
The dataset consists of all 327 counties and independent cities (Kreise und kreisfreie StÄ adte)
in West-Germany. The city of Wolfsburg is excluded due to some data restrictions.
Annual population is the average of quarterly ¯gures, o±cial projections based on
census data and resident registration information.
Unemployment rate is the o±cial annual ¯gure for the city or county as reported in
the statistics provided by the Federal Employment Service.
Total employment refers to the number of employed at the end of June at each year at
24local establishments as reported in the employment statistics based on the complete
set of social security accounts.
Manufacturing employment refers to employment in manufacturing establishments
(Produzierendes Gewerbe) as reported by the Statistical O±ces of the German States.
Wages and Salaries: The wage rate refers to the gross daily wage for a male full-time
(blue-collar) worker with low or medium skill level as taken from the IABS-REG
scienti¯c use ¯le of a 1% random sample of the social security accounts. As the data
are top-coded at the upper social security threshold, we restrict attention to low
and medium skilled workers. Speci¯cations (7) and (8) employ means of the daily
remuneration as of June 30th in the considered region and period. Speci¯cation (9)
and (10) use the underlying individual data.
Age and skill: The age is the individual age as reported in the IABS-REG. Skill is
a dummy re°ecting the existence of a vocational training degree. Note that highly
skilled employees, i.e. with a technical college (\Fachhochschule") or university de-
gree, are removed entirely from the dataset in order to avoid problems from the
top-coding of the remuneration ¯gures.
Industry dummies for 40 manufacturing and non{manufacturing sectors according to
the industry classi¯cation used by the Federal Labor O±ce.
Hours: Average weekly hours paid at the industry level for 40 manufacturing and non{
manufacturing sectors (for male blue collar workers only). Source: German Statistical
O±ce (\Statistisches Bundesamt", FS 16,2, Segmente 1612-1615, 5565-5568).
25Contract wages of blue collar workers: Industry speci¯c index of hourly contract
wages of male blue collar workers (1991=100). Source: German Statistical O±ce
(\Statistisches Bundesamt", FS 16,4.3, Segment 2561).
Contract wages of white collar workers: Industry speci¯c index of monthly contract
wages of male white collar workers (1991=100). Source: German Statistical O±ce
(\Statistisches Bundesamt", FS 16,4.3, Segment 2554).
Regional policy is a dummy variable for counties enclosing locations eligible for invest-
ment subsidies. For all years up to 1991, it is set to unity if for county i in year t at
least one of the following two conditions was satis¯ed:
1. The county encloses locations eligible for investment subsidies from the `Im-
provement of regional economic structure'-programm.
2. The county encloses locations which belong to the so-called `Zonenrandgebiet'.
For all years after 1991, the second condition is dropped since from the year 1992
onwards belonging to the former `Zonenrandgebiet' does no longer a®ect on the eli-
gibility for investment subsidies. If all locations in county i lose their status of being
eligible for subsidies during year t, ¼it was set to m=12, where m is the number
of months in year t in which ¯rms could still apply for subsidies. All information
concerning eligibility was taken from the annual report `Rahmenplan der Gemein-
schaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur'.
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